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In 2010 the psychologist and social worker Brene Brown gave a twenty 
minute TED talk titled ‘The Power of Vulnerability’ (Brown, 2010). It has 
proven very popular, being viewed over 28 million times at the time of 
writing (February 2017), and been subtitled in 52 different languages. 
That a concern with vulnerability to trauma and dealing with associated 
mental distress should be integral to professions such as psychology and 
social work should be no surprise. However, it is not only within the psy-
professions that the concept of vulnerability proliferates. Today, many 
political claims use the language of vulnerability, with campaign groups, 
including trade unions, increasingly justifying their case on the basis of 
the vulnerability of the particular individuals or groups they claim to 
represent, whether that is in demands for, inter alia, more resources, 
sympathetic immigration hearing or protection from physical and/or 
mental harm (McLaughlin, 2012). The twenty-first century has also seen 
the expansion of legal definitions of a ‘vulnerable adult’, meaning that 
more people can be so classified than would have been the case in 
previous years (Brown, 2015). In addition, new forms of state surveillance 
have been put in place to protect the growing numbers of ‘the 
vulnerable’, for example in the exponential increase in the number of 
people subject to criminal records checks for jobs, whether paid or 
voluntary, that in the past would not have required them (Appleton, 
2012).1  
For some, the concept of vulnerability can be harnessed for 
progressive social and political purposes, becoming a platform for 
collective forms of action from which social justice can be achieved. 
Vulnerability, from this perspective, offers the opportunity for a 
reconceptualization of human relations in general (e.g. Brown 2010), and 
for specific groups such as the physically disabled or people with 
learning disabilities in particular (e.g. Goodley and Runswick-Cole, 
2016). Others have highlighted problems with the way the discourse of 
vulnerability operates within modern society, seeing the operation of the 
vulnerability discourse as paving the way to state paternalism (Furedi, 
2004), reducing socio-political problems to psychoemotional ones 
(Wainwright and Calnan, 2002; Frawley, 2015) and representing a 
process of political stagnation and decline of a belief in wider social 
change (McLaughlin, 2012). The concept has also been critiqued in 
relation to particular areas such as education (Ecclestone and Hayes, 
2008) and specific groups such as young people (Brown, 2015), disabled 
people (Oliver, 1990) and people with learning difficulties (Hollomotz, 
2009). Vulnerability, then, has become a key component of contemporary 
                                                          
1 My main focus is on developments within the United Kingdom although similar 
developments are occurring in many Western countries in particular the United States of 
America. 
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sociological and political discourse, leading Brown (2015) to argue that 
we are living within a ‘vulnerability zeitgeist’.  
In this paper I discuss the concept of vulnerability in relation to 
the implications of its operation within certain socio-political discourses. 
In order to do this I first chart the rise of vulnerability in contemporary 
society by focusing on its expansion within the legal and welfare system 
and how it has been conceptualised within social theory. Second, I wish 
to highlight two, separate, but related developments within academia 
that combine political activism within a discourse of vulnerability; that of 
critical disability studies that highlights universal vulnerability as a 
radical, progressive social goal, and student demands for the university 
to be a ‘safe space’ free from emotional hurt and misrecognition. My aim 
in linking these two areas is to show that such developments are not 
confined to a rather niche aspect of social and political theorising, but 
rather have expanded to influence wider socio-political discourse and 
political activism. The political implications of this incorporation of a 
vulnerability ethos within political circles are then discussed. The 
conclusion emphasises the way in which notions of internalised 
vulnerability pose dangers for the political process. 
 
The Rise of the Vulnerable  
 
The utilisation of the concept of vulnerability is ubiquitous within UK 
social services and disciplinary systems of assessment for, and provision 
of, services, for example in the allocation/prioritisation of social housing, 
the protection of children, young people and many adults, and also plays 
a part within the criminal justice system. Such ubiquity can give the 
impression of a natural, ahistoric concept rather than a relatively recent 
framework for understanding both individual problems and social 
relations. Whilst not a new term it is one that has expanded in recent 
years to encompass ever more people within its reach. This can be 
demonstrated by a brief consideration of changing definitions within the 
legal field. 
In 1995, the Law Commission proposed the following definition of 
a ‘vulnerable person’:  
 
a “vulnerable person” should mean any person of 16 or over who 
(1) is or may be in need of community care services by reason of 
mental or other disability, age or illness and who (2) is or may be 
unable to take care of himself or herself, or unable to protect 
himself or herself against significant harm or serious exploitation.  
(Law Commission, 1995, p.159, my emphasis) 
 
Of significance is that vulnerability is not automatically assumed to flow 
from the specific categories mentioned in section one; the criteria in 
section two must also be met. In addition, even being at risk of harm or 
exploitation is not sufficient for the label of vulnerable to be applied, the 
harm must be significant, the exploitation serious. This definition was 
adapted by the Lord Chancellor’s Department in 1997 with ‘vulnerable 
person’ being replaced by ‘vulnerable adult’, and the word ‘serious’ was 
dropped to have a similar threshold for harm and exploitation, both being 
required to be ‘significant’. It is still widely used within local authorities’ 
informational literature whether in hard copy or online. 
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In 2000, the policy guidance document No Secrets, whilst keeping 
the 1997 definition, elaborated on what constituted ‘community care 
services’ ‘to include all care services in any setting or context’ (DH, 2000, 
para.2.4). The same year saw the introduction of the Care Standards Act 
2000 which expanded the definition to a quite considerable extent. A 
‘vulnerable adult’ no longer needed to belong to a specific service user 
category, nor did he or she need to be at risk of any form of harm or 
exploitation, never mind of a significant degree. Simply to use a social or 
health service could see you join the ranks of the officially ‘vulnerable’. 
The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, expanded the definition 
even further, defining health care as receiving ‘treatment, therapy or 
palliative care of any description’ (s.59[5]), my emphasis), whilst any 
provision of assistance by virtue of age, health or any disability also 
renders the recipient amongst the ranks of the vulnerable (s.59[5]). There 
have been some attempts to replace the label ‘vulnerable adult’ with 
‘person at risk’ but these have been largely ignored (Hollomotz, 2011). 
Whilst disabled theorists and activists would point out that we all 
require assistance as we go through daily life, with the disabled just 
requiring different forms or levels of assistance (e.g. Oliver, 1990), it is 
difficult to ignore the fact that this legislation in effect equates disability 
with vulnerability. Also of interest is the way the Act equated being in 
‘lawful custody’ or a ‘detained immigrant’ with being a vulnerable adult, 
which amounts to a sort of therapeutic exposition of criminology and a 
psychological reorientation of immigration policy that, at least in part, 
depoliticises it. Vulnerability then is linked to normative assumptions of 
deviance, deficit and deservingness (Emmel, 2017). 
The expansion of the legal definition may mean that more people 
can be classified as vulnerable but this does not necessarily relate to 
receiving additional welfare provision. In similar vein to the utilisation of 
the Lord Chancellor’s definition by local authorities, rather stricter 
criteria apply before being eligible for such support. In order to be 
assessed as eligible for social care services you need to show that:  
 
1. Your needs arise from (or are related to) a physical or mental 
impairment or illness, and 2. The issues you face have a 
significant impact on your wellbeing, and 3. You are unable to 
achieve two or more of the following activities: Eating and 
drinking; Maintaining personal hygiene; Managing toilet needs; 
Being appropriately clothed; Being able to make use of your home 
safely; Maintaining a habitable home environment; Developing or 
maintaining family or other personal relationships; Accessing and 
engaging in work, training, education or volunteering; Making use 
of necessary facilities or services in the local community including 
public transport and recreational facilities or services; Carrying 
out caring responsibilities the adult has for a child.  
(MCC, no date, online, my emphasis) 
 
That access to services still requires a relatively high threshold to be met 
indicates that the wider expansion of the term is a cultural phenomenon 
only tangentially related to the provision of social support services. For 
example, if there is a relatively specific, if wide-ranging, definition within 
the legislature, this is not the case within social policy and organisational 
circles where there are frequently problems with how vulnerability is 
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defined. In a detailed analysis of the academic literature, Brown identifies 
five different, if overlapping, uses of the concept of vulnerability: 
 
‘natural’ or ‘innate’ vulnerability, determined by physical and/or 
personal factors that are often associated with certain points of the 
lifecourse such as childhood and old age; ‘situational’ 
vulnerability, referring to biographical circumstances. Situational 
difficulties or transgressions – this can include the input of a third 
party or structural force, and can also involve human agency 
(often to a contested extend); vulnerability as related to social 
disadvantage, the environment and/or geographical spaces; 
universal vulnerability, where vulnerability is seen as a sate 
shared by all citizens, but which is socially or politically 
constituted to varying extents; and vulnerability as a concept 
closely related to risk. 
(p.28) 
 
She perceptively notes how ‘the term seems to be used less in its 
relational sense (where someone is vulnerable to something specific, such 
as illness or violence) and more as a stand-alone term’ (Brown, 2015, 
p.3).  
Vulnerability, in the wider cultural sense, speaks to a sense of 
insecurity, alienation and powerlessness. In addition to these aspects of 
the debate I would add another, that of vulnerability as a signifier of the 
contemporary human subject, an identity rather than a social relation. In 
effect, it has become a noun.  
 
From innate vulnerability to radical vulnerability  
 
The idea of innate vulnerability applies to everyone but tends to refer to 
specific parts of the lifecourse such as childhood and older age, or in 
relation to certain people throughout the lifecourse due to physical 
and/or mental impairment. Such perspectives have been subject to 
much criticism, for example in relation to children it has been pointed 
out that the concept of, and attitudes to, childhood varies historically 
and culturally, there being no universal notion of a ‘child’ (Burman, 
2016). Many disabled writers also question the dominant view that they 
are innately vulnerable, arguing that in locating vulnerability as within 
the individual the role of society in the construction of disabled people’s 
vulnerability is downplayed or ignored (e.g. Oliver and Sapey, 2006).  
In articulating a social model of disability the Union of Physically 
Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) made a crucial distinction between 
‘impairment’ and ‘disability’. The former is viewed as being ‘the functional 
limitation within the individual caused by physical, mental or sensory 
impairment’, the latter as being ‘the disadvantage or restriction of activity 
caused by contemporary social organisation, which takes little or no 
account of people who have impairments, and thus excludes them from 
many mainstream social activities’ (UPIAS, 1976, pp.3-4). From this 
perspective, disability is ‘the loss or limitation of opportunities to 
participate in normal community life on an equal basis with non-disabled 
citizens’ (ibid.). In other words, disability is the result of an impairment 
meeting a non-hospitable society.  
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In attempting to change societal perceptions of disability, a key 
area of intervention has been over terminology, language being seen as 
not merely reflecting reality but as actively constructing and perpetuating 
existing social relations (Parker, 2007). For example, Oliver and Barnes 
(1998) assert that ‘the use of the phrase “people with disabilities” is 
unacceptable because it blurs the crucial distinction between impairment 
and disability’ (p. 18). They prefer the term ‘disabled people’ as this sits 
more closely with the social model of disability which views disability as 
arising due to the way society is organised in such a way as to exclude 
disabled people. Similarly, in terms of intellectual impairment, many 
prefer the term ‘learning difficulties’ over that of ‘learning disability’, the 
former term implying that people are able to learn once difficulties in the 
learning process are overcome, although it should be acknowledged that 
many would prefer not to be labelled at all (Goodley, 2000). When words 
are seen as holding such power, it should be little surprise that battles 
over what is acceptable and unacceptable public discourse have grown in 
recent years and have become a key battleground, not only within 
academic theorising but political activism also. I will return to this later 
in relation to demands for ‘safe spaces’ and calls to curtail speech. 
A belief in the innate vulnerability of certain people or groups can 
also lead to a patronising, protective attitude towards them that can 
undermine their rights and deny them agency. Such a discourse acts to 
single out and ‘other’ certain groups in ways that can be controlling, 
stigmatising and oppressive (Brown, 2015). For example, in relation to 
people with learning difficulties, Hollomotz (2009) argues that the 
concept of vulnerability can be too simplistic in accounting for the 
diverse processes involved in the formation of sexual violence, and 
therefore we need to go beyond vulnerability in order to conceptualise the 
dynamics behind sexual violence and learning difficulties. She notes how 
the label ‘vulnerable’ can override a person’s wishes as procedures 
dictate process rather than either the person’s wishes or a worker’s 
judgement, giving the example of a woman with learning disabilities who 
confided to a support worker that she had been sexually assaulted some 
months previously. Despite the woman insisting she did not wish it to be 
followed up on, because she was labelled a ‘vulnerable adult’ this wish 
was overridden and the police and social services got involved, a process 
she found made her revisit something she had wished to put behind her 
(Hollomotz, 2011). In addition, many people with learning difficulties find 
their ability to choose even the more mundane aspects of daily life 
curtailed on account of their ‘vulnerability’.  
In contrast to a deviance/deficit model of vulnerability, some 
scholars in the fields of law and family welfare (e.g. Fineman, 2010; 
Emmel, 2017) propose a more relational account that contrasts 
‘universal vulnerability’ and ‘particular vulnerabilities’. The former refers 
to experiences ‘pertaining to the body that may affect us all at different 
times across the life-course’ (Emmel, 2017, p.2) whilst the latter is rooted 
in, ‘the interruption or destruction of social relationships’ (Fineman, 
2010, p.268). However, whereas Fineman’s theoretical approach tends to 
see autonomy and vulnerability as oppositional terms, Emmel instead 
proposes a different approach that ‘treats autonomy as an intrinsic 
property of vulnerability’ (p.2). Such a perspective seeks to ‘account for 
an individual’s agency and how this might be exercised within legal and 
social structures’ (ibid.). 
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In recognition of this, many disabled theorists and activists choose 
not to challenge the presumption of vulnerability, but rather to embrace 
it and seek to expand the category by emphasising that vulnerability is 
an inevitable part of the human condition (e.g. Oliver and Sapey, 2006; 
Fineman, 2010). In doing so, the intention is to highlight the ways in 
which we are all vulnerable, some more so than others, some for longer 
than others, but nevertheless, vulnerability is a human universal. In 
addition, it is pointed out that to cope with life we all require the help 
and support of others, whether that is in the form of such things as 
social organisation, emotional connection or healthcare. From this 
perspective, acknowledging, embracing, celebrating even, our common 
vulnerability can play a part in fostering a more tolerant and inclusive 
society, as well as a more socially just welfare state as a counter to the 
current neo-liberal one. For such writers the aim is to  
 
‘depathologise official categories by recasting vulnerability as a 
progressive attribute of a relational citizenship, integral to the 
“fragile and contingent nature of personhood” where we are all 
“potentially vulnerable” and where vulnerability is a “universal” 
ontolological dimension of human experience and identity’. 
(Ecclestone and Goodley, 2016, p.177) 
  
Such an approach, it is hoped, will allow people to be protected from any 
detrimental effects of potential vulnerabilities and also from pathologising 
and intrusive state-sponsored interventions, whilst simultaneously 
allowing those with current actual vulnerabilities to be supported 
according to their specific situation and associated needs. 
From these perspectives, collective and specific vulnerabilities are 
presented as a potential source of political mobilisation, for example by 
highlighting the suffering caused by contemporary social, economic and 
political relations. Vulnerability is here utilised for anti-capitalist and 
social reformist purposes. Butler links notions of vulnerability to that of 
precarity as a vehicle to combat oppression: ‘precariousness [is] a 
function of our social vulnerability and exposure that is always given 
some political form, and precarity as differentially distributed [is] one 
important dimension of the unequal distribution of conditions required 
for continued life’ (quoted in Ecclestone and Goodley, 2016, p.178). In a 
similar vein to standpoint theory, where the oppressed are said to have a 
better understanding of the reality of social conditions than the rulers, 
precarity and vulnerability can awaken us to the problems of the age. 
As I argue next, the focus on, and reconceptualization of, 
vulnerability, is not only seen as central to the pursuit of social justice, 
for some it entails a radical reappraisal of what it means to be human, 
and a need for newer ‘post-human’ understandings of the human Subject 
(Goodley and Runswick-Cole, 2016; Liddiard, 2016).  
 
Disabling the human, enabling the post-human  
 
The Subject of humanism has come under sustained attack from many 
radical circles, to such an extent that we have a rather ‘ticklish’ subject 
(Zizek, 1999,) one with a heightened sense of personal vulnerability amid 
a crisis of meaning in relation to what it means to be human (Delsol, 
2003). As we shall see this critique of humanism has influenced the 
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trajectory of not only contemporary theory but political activism also, 
contributing to demands for the protection of the vulnerable and 
emotionally fragile self. 
Humanist thought with its emphasis on rationality, autonomy and 
competence is said to ‘other’ those subjects who for whatever reason fail 
to live up to this ideal. Influenced by poststructuralism, humanism’s 
critics seek to destabilise binaries and fixed notions of what it means to 
be human. The idea of the human subject, a key component of liberal 
thought since the Enlightenment, is not only contested but stands 
accused of propagating oppressive social relations both at home and 
across the globe. Within poststructuralist thought, the Subject (with a 
capital S) is a burden of which we would be better relieved, as in 
actuality, such a Subject is invariably ‘man-white-western-male-adult-
reasonable-heterosexual-living in towns-speaking a standard language’ 
(quoted in Goodley, 2007, p.154).  
Those who fail to meet this vision of the human are then classed 
as ‘other’, as less human, or non-human. Within the field of critical 
disability studies biopedagogies are said to ‘serve to produce the 
archetypal (masculine, cisgender, white, non-disabled, middle class, 
straight) citizen and autonomous human subject under neoliberal 
capitalism. Those considered other to this limited conceptualisation of 
humanity are positioned to fail’ (Rice, et al., 2016, p.6). In other words, 
some of us are more human than others, and there are some who are 
excluded from the category altogether.2 
For some, such as Goodley, this is inevitable as the humanist 
subject defines himself by what he excludes.3 Taking an affirmative 
approach to vulnerability,  
 
shifts us away from a humanist reliance on the independent 
sovereign self to a post-human celebration of interdependence. The 
vulnerable self depends upon others to live. Numerous disabled 
selves that are normatively understood as dependent are now 
recast as sources of interdependence. Disability, we might suggest, 
demands interdependency, thus inviting new ways of thinking 
about what it means to be a (post) human subject. 
  (Ecclestone and Goodley, 2016, p.180). 
 
In much post-humanist thinking, Deleuze’s concept of the rhizome is 
used against the ‘arborescent’ way of thinking and viewing individuals 
and their lived experiences. People are rhizomatic, not arboresent, not 
singular growing to a relative height that places them in a hierarchical 
position to some and subservient position to others. Rhizomes shift, 
appear everywhere, are interconnected, it is impossible to find a 
                                                          
2 Rice’s additional categories to those mentioned by Weiss seventeen years earlier may 
note a changing focus of political expression but it also highlights what has been called 
‘the endless etcetera of difference’ where another aspect of identity can be forever added 
(Heartfield, 2002). Any hope of collective identification is continually fragmented; we can 
end up with as many identities as we have people, individualism via radical 
deconstruction. 
3 The desire to be all inclusive is exemplified in the realm of lesbian and gay rights. The 
LG was soon extended to include bisexual people to give us the LGB acronym, soon after 
transpeople were added to make LGBT, with this being gradually extended to give us the 
more inclusive but tortured acronym LBGTQQIA (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, 
Queer, Questioning, Intersex and Asexual). 
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beginning or an end, it is always in the middle, not being but becoming, 
interbeing, intermezzo (Goodley, 2007). The emphasis is on the rhizome 
as alliance, always connected rather than the filial nature of the tree. The 
tree asks us ‘to be’ but the rhizome carries within it the conjunction 
‘and…and…and [which] carries enough force to shake and uproot the 
verb “to be”’ (quoted in Goodley, 2007, p.149). The rhizome is not 
localised, it is always in between. People then are not fixed, static, points; 
they are always in a process of becoming. In employing Deleuzian 
concepts, Goodley (2007) suggests that they can ‘contribute to the 
development of disability studies as they ‘refute the static formation of 
human subjects; challenge the fixed boundaries between disabled and 
non-disabled bodies; deconstruct the certain bodies of medicine and 
individualization; [and] promote the interconnected nature of human 
becomings’ (p.157). 
Humanism, from this perspective, devalues difference, something 
said to be inevitable because ‘Humanism can only spawn and value those 
kinds of humans that match its prototype’ (Ecclestone and Goodley, 
2016, p.180). Such a critique lies, in part, on the correct observation that 
the abstract notions of universality, reason and equality associated with 
humanism do not fit with a pluralistic and inegalitarian world. For 
Horkheimer (1941), reason degenerated ‘because it was the ideological 
projection of a false universality’ (p.36).4 For some, such as Levi-Strauss, 
the roots of the Nazi Holocaust were to be found in Enlightenment 
humanism: 
 
All the tragedies we have lived through, first with colonialism, then 
with fascism, finally the concentration camps, all this has taken 
shape not in opposition to or in contradiction with so-called 
humanism in the form in which we have been practising it for 
several centuries, but I would say almost as its natural 
continuation. 
(quoted in Malik, 1996, p. 241) 
 
However, to indict Enlightenment ideals of universalism, reason and 
progress as leading to the horrors of the twentieth-century, and other 
forms of social oppression, is to proffer a rather one-sided and ahistorical 
reading. Arguably it was not the ideals, but rather the degradation of the 
ideals that led to the aforementioned barbarism. It was not reason itself 
that was the problem but that ‘the last traces of reflectiveness and of a 
will of one’s own, which human beings can possess are reduced to 
nothing by the social (political) institution’ (Castoriadis, 1997, p.168).  
Jacoby (1999) accuses postmodern/poststructural writers of 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Noting how Enlightenment 
ideals are criticised as being camouflage for the powerful, he accuses its 
critics of going too far. For him,  
                                                          
4 It is worth pointing out that an anti-universalist outlook was once a conservative trait. 
The French philosopher Joseph D’Maistre, writing in the wake of the French Revolution, 
said of the 1795 Constitution that it was ‘made for man. But there is no such thing as 
man in the world. During my life, I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, and so on; 
thanks to Montesquieu, I even know that one can be Persian; but I must say, as for man, 
I have never come across him anywhere; if he exists, he is completely unknown to me.’ 
http://maistre.uni.cx/considerations_on_france.html  
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the goal was to realize the ideals, however, not jettison them, as if 
injustice improves with cynicism. The notions of equality or 
universal love were not false in themselves; they were falsified by a 
reality that required changing. 
  (p.125)  
 
In other words it was the corruption of the ideals within the existing 
socio-political environment, not the ideals themselves, that was the 
problem. 
In conceptualising the dis/human, Goodley and Runswick-Cole 
(2016) use it in such a way as to ‘recognise the norm, the pragmatic and 
political value of claiming the norm while always seeking to disrupt and 
contest it’ (p.5). Or, as Liddiard (2016) puts, it ‘the dis/human 
acknowledges a desire for the Human, at the same time as challenging its 
very narrow boundaries’ (online). 
This is a key point, and one that, to my mind, makes such writers 
more aligned to humanism than against it, despite their espoused 
antipathy towards it. The rational, autonomous subject is an ideal, it is 
an aspiration, a goal for humanity to be able to create a better society 
and to realise the human potential. Of course, this is easier said than 
done, and as many have pointed out there have been many atrocities 
done in the pursuit of human ‘progress’. However, like the dis/human, 
humanists desire an improved Human, in terms of overcoming the 
barriers to the pursuit of a worthwhile life. It may always be tantalisingly 
outwith our grasp, but the more we reach out and expand our capacities 
the closer we will come to the ideal. However, as I show below, seeing 
progressive political capital in the embrace of vulnerability is to mistake a 
fact of life for the historically specific way such a concept is utilised 
within contemporary society. 
 
From Radical Vulnerability to Vulnerable Radicals  
 
Analyses of vulnerability often acknowledge that like risk and fear it is 
primarily a subjective, not objective phenomenon. However, for Ahmed 
(2014), what is relatively unconsidered is the question of ‘why some 
bodies are more afraid than others? How do feelings of vulnerability take 
shape?’ (p.68). Ahmed notes that whilst fear may be experienced 
individually it is ‘structural and mediated, rather than an immediate 
bodily response to an objective danger’ (p.69), and hence such feelings of 
vulnerability ‘shape women’s bodies as well as how those bodies inhabit 
space’ (ibid. p.70).  
However, if feelings of vulnerability are structured and mediated, 
they are also historically specific in relation to how they are experienced, 
conceptualised and strategized, both in relation to how to improve both 
individual feelings and the social conditions from within which they 
arise. For example, the rise of ‘work stress’ was, to a large degree, a 
result of trade unions recasting problematic workplace relations in the 
language of individual vulnerability, the change in focus being due to the 
weakening of older more collective responses, such as industrial action, 
to such issues (Wainwright and Calnan, 2002). The rise of the ‘survivor 
identity’ in recent years has also been influenced by the changing nature 
of both individual and group demands for recognition of individual 
vulnerability rather than collective strength (McLaughlin, 2012).  
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From certain current radical standpoints, one strategy to 
counteract such feelings of vulnerability is to create ‘safe spaces’ to allow 
feelings, experiences and strategies for change to be expressed and 
developed. This approach has taken a foothold within universities in the 
UK and USA in recent years. Linked to the demand for safe spaces within 
universities is the growing cry for ‘trigger warnings’ to be placed on any 
course material that may contain potentially upsetting discussions (e.g. 
around rape or racism). In defence of both safe spaces and trigger 
warnings, Ahmed (2015) views them ‘as a partial and necessarily 
inadequate measure to enable some people to stay in the room so that 
“difficult issues” can be discussed’ (online). Likewise, ‘safe spaces’ are a 
way 
 
to enable conversations about difficult issues to happen: so often 
those conversations do not happen because the difficulties people 
wish to talk about end up being re-enacted within spaces, which is 
how they are not talked about. For example, conversations about 
racism are very hard to have when white people become defensive 
about racism: those conversations end up being about those 
defences rather than about racism. We have safe spaces so we can 
talk about racism not so we can avoid talking about racism. 
(ibid.) 
  
From this perspective, safe spaces and trigger warnings are essential for 
increasing debate and dialogue.5 
At face value this can be viewed as unproblematic. There is 
nothing wrong with a group of people meeting to discuss issues that they 
feel concern them in a more direct way than others; we must surely 
uphold the right to free association. Likewise, university campuses, like 
wider society, should be a place where people are not threatened with 
violence or intimidation.  
However, the concept of the safe space is no longer confined to a 
specific area such as a classroom or meeting room where like-minded 
people could discuss issues in a semi-private forum, contemporary 
demands are often made on the basis that more and more aspects of 
university life should be a safe space. For example, the mere presence of 
speakers on campus with views some consider objectionable is now often 
considered to contravene the offended person’s safe space.6 Today’s safe 
space must also be one in which people are kept safe from theoretical, 
political and religious views that upsets their sense of well-being, thereby 
making them feel vulnerable (Slater, 2016). 
I would argue that it is not possible, or indeed desirable, for people 
to be protected from harmful ideas and opinions. The very nature of 
education will expose students to ideas and opinions that they find 
upsetting, with deeply held but unquestioned views being exposed to 
                                                          
5 It would be a mistake to see today’s ‘safe spaces’ as equivalent to the Black and 
women’s ‘consciousness-raising’ groups of the 1970s and 1980s. Whilst there was often a 
therapeutic dimension to the latter groups, they were more concerned with 
understanding and strategizing against often blatant and serious instances of violence, 
discrimination and oppression.  
6 For an example of this see the disruption caused when Maryam Namazie was invited to 
speak at Goldsmith’s University, with the protestors saying her presence and views 
violated their safe space. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-1ZiZdz5nao  
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opposing perspectives and ways of understanding and living in the world. 
That is the uncomfortable beauty of education, being taken out of your 
narrow, comfortable safe space and confronted by alternative ways of 
thinking about and being in the world. 
Similarly, it is not unreasonable to allow students to feel free to 
express their views, feelings and experiences in a forum where they will 
not be subject to personal ridicule or abuse. Any good teacher or lecturer 
should be encouraging such an environment for their students. However, 
ridicule and attack should not be equated with challenge and 
disagreement, with the speaker being asked to elaborate on and defend 
such views. Once we move out of the classroom or private meeting, the 
exchange of ideas can be robust, passionate and likely to cause offence to 
someone, and from this there should be no safe space. Ridicule and 
attack are part of political and public debate, and you never know, you 
may come to see that it was deserved, leading you to change or modify 
your previously held beliefs. Unfortunately, recent years have seen the 
demand for safe spaces proliferate to the extent that public meetings 
have been cancelled, speakers whose views are deemed to be offensive 
and hurtful disinvited, and many activists refusing to share a platform 
with people they disagree with due to finding their views harmful and 
offensive (Fox, 2016; Slater, 2016). Here, similar notions of vulnerability 
and childlike innocence coalesce around what has been termed the 
‘snowflake student’ (Fox, 2016).  
 
The Power of Silence: Maintaining a ‘safe space’  
 
The evidence would suggest that Ahmed’s optimism that such measures 
as safe spaces and trigger warnings would help increase public 
discussion is misplaced. For example, an article in the Washington 
Examiner claims that two university professors were warned about 
discussing ‘controversial’ issues in class, in these cases transgenderism 
and homosexuality, following complaints from two students who found 
the content distressing. One of the complainants reportedly said, ‘I would 
just like the professor to be educated about what trans is and how what 
he said is not okay because as someone who truly identifies as a 
transwomen [sic] I was very offended and hurt by this’. Both professors 
received a visit from the university’s Orwellian-sounding Bias Response 
Team, with one professor advised ‘not to revisit transgender issues in his 
classroom if possible to avoid the students’ expressed concerns’, whilst 
the other stated ‘I do not believe that students should be required to 
listen to their own rights and personhood debated… [This professor] 
should remove these topics from the list of debate topics (Schow, 2016, 
online). 
The prominent feminist Germaine Greer has been prevented from 
speaking at universities in the UK due to her ‘misogynistic views towards 
trans women’ (Melhuish, no date, online). Rachael Melhuish, women’s 
officer at Cardiff University students’ union, who set up a campaign on 
‘change.org’ calling on the University to disinvite Greer, said that ‘While 
debate in a University should be encouraged, hosting a speaker with 
such problematic and hateful views towards marginalised and vulnerable 
groups is dangerous (ibid. my emphasis). Following this ban, the veteran 
gay rights campaigner Peter Tatchell found himself at the centre of a 
media storm after one student union officer refused to share a platform 
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with him in a university debate, due to him signing an open letter to a 
UK newspaper in support of free speech and against the banning of 
Germaine Greer (McVeigh, 2016). 
There are many more examples from British universities. To cite 
just a few. Dapper Laughs, the comic creation of Daniel O’Reilly, had a 
performance scheduled for Cardiff University called off after a campaign 
by feminist students who claimed that his character violated the 
university’s ‘Anti-Lad Culture Policy’ in that it dehumanised women by 
trivialising such things as rape and unprotected sex (McDermott, 2016). 
At Christ Church College, Oxford, university authorities cancelled a 
debate on abortion due to ‘potential security and welfare issues’. This 
followed a campaign by some protestors and the Oxford University 
Students’ Union Women’s Campaign, who berated the debate’s 
organisers for holding an event at which ‘two cis-gender men debate what 
people with uteruses should be doing with their bodies’ (ibid, p.22). In 
2001, the University of Sheffield students’ union banned the music of the 
rap star Eminem on the grounds that his ‘homophobia and misogyny’ 
spoiled the university’s ‘culture of tolerance, equality and respect’ (quoted 
in O’Neill, 2016, p.10). This was not an isolated incident, with, more 
recently, the song Blurred Lines by Jason Thicke being banned by many 
universities’ student unions due to its ‘sexist’ lyrics. The Sun newspaper 
and magazines such as Loaded have also fallen foul of student union 
censors. In addition to pop songs, some university student unions have 
also banned sombreros claiming that non-Mexicans wearing them is 
offensive to Mexicans. One US college has gone so far as to proscribe 
‘inappropriately directed laughter’ (quoted in Slater, 2016a, p.2). 
Whilst there was often a censorious element to early feminist 
campaigns, for example in calls to ban pornography (e.g. MacKinnon and 
Dworkin, 1985), there was also a desire to expand public debate by 
giving women a voice, to allow hitherto silenced groups to break the 
silence and have their experiences and contributions to society 
recognised. Today, however, we are more likely to hear calls to have 
voices silenced. Such is the power given to words that some words are 
deemed too dangerous to be heard.  
Unsurprisingly, debates about the issue of free speech have 
proliferated in response to the increase in calls to censor speakers, 
demand for safe spaces and the search for means of reducing 
interpersonal offence. I am on the side of free speech, the academy, of all 
places, should be one where the free exchange of ideas can take place. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, it is not the validity of the claims 
that are the main concern, but rather the way they are justified on the 
basis that hearing offensive views is harmful to the psyche. In other 
words, the claims are made on the basis of the vulnerability of the 





The discourse of vulnerability within contemporary society can be a 
mechanism to allow some people to receive the support they require to 
enable them to achieve a higher level of social functioning and personal 
well-being. However, the radical embrace of vulnerability needs to be 
seen in historical context. In contrast to older political movements, this is 
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not an expression of a robust movement struggling against the forces of 
oppression, in a fight against the repressive force of the state. On the 
contrary, such radicals are more likely to view the state as a force to 
which calls for protection are to be made, institutional authority being 
called upon to offer protection from forms of harm that enhance the 
radical sense of vulnerability. Radical demands in the past were often 
about protections from the state, today they are more likely to be 
demands for protection by the state.  
Calls for censorship and attacks on the academy’s freedom to 
debate issues no matter how controversial or counter to the prevailing 
moral or political consensus are nothing new. What is new is that today’s 
attacks on academic freedom are more likely to come ‘not from outside 
the university, but from within, and not from the political right, but from 
the radical left. From the students’ perspective, censorship went from 
being something to rail against to a morally righteous and politically 
radical act’ (Williams, 2016, p.53).7 What is striking is that the 
censorious students are not on their own even within the academy, on 
the contrary they are championed by many academics. Indeed, it is the 
latter who have paved the way for moral censure on campus by 
campaigning for speech and behaviour codes in an earlier era, demands 
that were made on the basis of the power of words to cause harm, and 
the dangers of informal, unregulated social interaction. So, whilst the 
sphere of student politics provides worrying examples of this trend and it 
is tempting to dismiss such examples as due to the follies of youth and 
inexperience, this would be to misunderstand the relationship between 
the tactics and beliefs of these students, their ‘radical’ predecessors and 
present day academics and activists. It would also be to miss the way 
such sentiments and restrictions on speech are becoming 
institutionalised not only within academia but the wider social and 
political sphere.  
Civil society itself is reconfigured as a dangerous and hurtful 
environment of hostile and hurtful views and expressions and therefore 
needs to be reconfigured as a ‘safe space’ of sterile and ultimately 
conservative social interaction as speech, dress and expression are seen 
as in need of policing by the authorities. The concept of universal 
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